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POELKER v. DOE 519 
Per Curiam 
POELKER, MAYOR OF ST. LOUIS, ET AL. v. DOE 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
No. 75-442. Argued January 11, 1977-Decided June 20, 1977 
The city of St. Louis, in electjng, as a policy choice, to provide publicly 
financed hospital services for childbirth but not for nontherapeutic 
abortions, held not to violate any constitutional rights. Maher v. Roe, 
ante, p. 464. 
515 F. 2d 541, reversed and remanded. 
Eugene P. Freeman argued the cause for petitioners. With 
him on the brief was Jack L. Koehr. 
Frank Susman argued the cause and filed a brief for 
respondent.* 
PER CURIAM. 
Respondent Jane Doe, an indigent, sought unsuccessfully 
to obtain a nontherapeutic abortion at Starkloff Hospital, one 
of two city-owned public hospitals in St. Louis, Mo. She 
subsequently brought this class action under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 
against the Mayor of St. Louis and the Director of Health and 
Hospitals, alleging that the refusal by Starkloff Hospital to 
provide the desired abortion violated her constitutional rights. 
Although the District Court ruled against Doe following a 
trial, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed in 
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Leo Pfeffer for 
the American Jewish Congress et al.; and by Sylvia A. Law, Harriet F. 
Pilpelr and Eve W. Paul for the American Public Health Assn. et al. 
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by D ennis J. Horan, Dolores V. Horan, 
an.d Victor G. Rosenblum for Americans United for Life, Inc.; by Jerome 
M . McLaughlin for Missouri Doctors for Life; and by Robert E. Rater-
mann for James R. Butler et al. 
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an opmwn that accepted both her factual and legal argu-
ments. 515 F. 2d 541 (1975).1 
The Court of Appeals concluded that Doe's inability to ob-
tain an abortion resulted from a combination of a policy 
directive by the Mayor and a longstanding staffing practice 
at Starkloff Hospital. The directive, communicated to the . 
Director of Health and Hospitals by the Mayor, prohibited 
the performance of abortions in the city hospitals except when 
there was a threat of grave physiological injury or death 
to the mother. Under the staffing practice, the doctors and 
medical students at the obstetrics-gynecology clinic at the 
hospital are drawn from the faculty and students at the St. 
Louis University School of Medicine, a Jesuit-operated insti-
tution opposed to abortion. Relying on our decisions in 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bo'lton, 410 
U. S. 179 (1973), the Court of Appeals held that the city's 
policy and the hospital's staffing practice denied the "constitu-
tional rights of indigent pregnant women .. . long after those . 
rights had been clearly enunciated" in Roe and Doe. 515 F. 
2d, at 547. The court cast the issue in an equal protection 
mold, finding that the provision of publicly financed hospital 
services for childbirth but not for elective abortions constituted 
invidious discrimination. In support of its equal protection 
analysis, the court also emphasized the contrast between 
nonindigent women who can afford to obtain abortions in 
private hospitals and indigent women who cannot. Particu-
lar reliance was placed upon the previous decision in Wulff 
v. Singleton, 508 F. 2d 1211 (CA8 1974), reversed on other 
grounds, 428 U. S. 106 (1976), in which the Court of Appeals 
1 The facts concerning Doe's visit to the hospital and the reason for her 
inability to obtain an abortion are hotly disputed. Our view that the 
Court of Appeals erred in the application of the law to the facts as stated 
in its opinion makes it unnecessary to describe or resolve this conflict. 
POELKER v. DOE 521 
519 Per Curiam 
had held unconstitutional a state Medicaid statute that pro-
vided benefits for women who carried their pregnancies to 
term but denied t~em for women who sought elective abor-
tions. The court stated that " [ t] here is no practical distinc-
tion between that case and this one." 515 F. 2d, at 545. 
We agree that the constitutional question presented here r 
is identical in principle with that presented by a State's re-
fusal tD provide Medicaid benefits for abortions while pro-
viding them for childbirth. This was the issue before us. in 
~ 
Maher V. RO!J.J, ante, p. 464. For the reasons set forth in ourJ 
opinion in that case, we find no G.QDstitutiQ.nal violatio11 by 
....... ---·the city of St. Louis in electing, a~ a policy ch_Q_ice, to provide 
public y :financed hosp1tal services for childbirtl; witheii:i't pro-
viding correspondi~es ~ nonJJi"erap;titic abortions. 
In tfie ~of theGourt of AppealS;nd'Tn th-; briefs sup-
porting that decision, emphasis is placed on Mayor Poelker's 
personal opposition to abortion, characterized as "a wanton, 
callous disregard" · for the constitutional rights of indigent 
women. 515 F. 2d, at 547. Although the Mayor's personal 
position on abortion is irrelevant to our decision, we note that 
he is an elected official responsible to the people of St. Louis. 
His policy of denying city funds for abortions such as that 
desired by Doe is subject to public debate and approval or 
disapproval at the polls. We merely hold, for the reasons 
stated in Maher, that the Constitution does not forbid a State 
or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a 
preference for normal childbirth as St. Louis has clone.2 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
2 The Court of Appeals awarded attorney's fees to respondent under the 
"bad faith" exception to the traditional American Rule disfavoring al-
lowance of such fees to the prevailing party. See Alyeska Pipeline 
Co. v. Wildern ess Society, 421 U. S. 240 (1975). It follows from our 
decision on the constitutional merits that it was an error to award 
attorney's fees to respondent. 
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is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is s·a ordered. 
[For dissenting opmwn of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, see -
ante, p. 454.] 
[For dissenting opinion of MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, see 
ante, p. 462.] 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JusTICE MAR-
SHALL and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. 
The Court holds that St. Louis may constitutionally refuse 
to permit the performance of elective abortions in its city-
owned hospitals while providing hospital services to women 
who carry their pregnancies to term. As stated by the Court 
of Appeals: 
"Stripped of all rhetoric, the city here, through its policy 
and staffing procedure, is simply telling indigent women, 
like Doe, that if they choose to carry their pregnancies to 
term, the city will provide physicians and medical facili-
ties for full maternity care; but if they choose to ~xer­
cise their constitutionally protected right to determine 
that they wish to terminate the pregnancy, the city will 
not provide physicians and facilities for the abortion pro-
cedure, even though it is probably safer than going 
through a full pregnancy and childbirth." 515 F. 2d 541, 
544 (1975). 
The Court of Appeals held that St. Louis could not in this 
Vi'ay "interfer[e] in her decision of whether to bear a child or 
have an abortion simply because she is indigent and unable 
to afford private treatment," ibid., because it was constitu-
tionally impermissible that indigent women be "'subjected to 
State coercion to bear children which they do not wish to 
bear [while] no other women similarly situated are so co-
erced,' " id., at 545, 
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For the reasons set forth in my dissent in Maher v. Roe, 
ante, p. 482, I would affirm the Court of Appeals. Here the 
fundamental right of a woman freely to choose to terminate 
her pregnancy has been infringed by the city of St. Louis 
through a deliberate policy based on opposition to elective 
abortions on moral grounds by city officials. While it may 
still be possible for some indigent women to obtain abortions 
in clinics or private hospitals, it is clear that the city policy 
is a significant, and in some cases insurmountable, obstacle 
to indigent pregnant women who cannot pay for abortions 
in those private facilities. Nor is the closing of St. Louis' 
public hospitals an isolated instance with little practical 
significance. The importance of today's decision is greatly 
magnified by the fact that during 1975 and the first quarter 
of 1976 only about 187'o of all public hospitals in the country 
provided abortion services, and in 10 States there were no 
public hospitals providing such services.1 
A number of difficulties lie beneath the surface of the 
Court's holding. Public hospitals that do not permit the 
performance of elective abortions will frequently have physi-
cians on their staffs who would willingly perform them. This 
may operate in some communities significantly to reduce the 
number of physicians who are both willing and able to per-
form abortions in a hospital setting. It is not a complete 
answer that many abortions may safely be performed in clin-
ic~, for some physicians will not be affiliated with those clinics, 
and some abortions may pose unacceptable risks if performed 
outside a hospital. Indeed, such an answer would be ironic, 
for if the result is to force some abortions to be performed in 
a clinic that properly should be performed in a hospital, the 
city policy will have operated to increase rather than reduce 
health risks associated with abortions; and in Roe v. Wade, 
1 Sullivan, Tietze, & Dryfoos, Legal Abortion in the United States, 1975-
1976, 9 Family Planning Perspectives 116, 121, 128 (1977). 
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410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973), the Court permitted regulation by 
the State solely to protect maternal health . 
The Court's holding will also pose difficulties in small com-
munities where the public hospital is the only nearby health 
care facility. If such a public hospital is closed to abortions, 
any woman-rich or poor-will be seriously inconvenienced; ' 
and for some women-particularly poor women-the unavail-
ability of abortions in the public hospital will be an insuper-
able obstacle. Indeed, a recent survey suggests that the 
decision in this case will be felt most strongly in rural areas, 
where the public hospital will in all likelihood be closed to 
elective abortions, and where there will not be sufficient 
demand to support a separate abortion clinic.2 
Because the city policy constitutes "coercion [of women] to 
bear children which they do not wish to bear," Roe v. Wade 
and the eases following it require that the city show a com-
pelling state interest that justifies this infringeme:rl.t upon the 
fundamental right to choose to have an abortion. "[E]xpress-
ing a preference for normal childbirth," ante, at 521, does not 
satisfy that standard. Roe explicitly held that during the first 
trimester no state interest in regulating abortions was com-
pelling, and that during the second trimester the State's in-
terest was compelling only insofar as it protected maternal 
health. 410 U. S., at 162-164. Under Roe, the State's 
"important and legitimate interest in potential life," id., at 
2 "The concentration of services among relatively few providers-
mostly clinics-in the nation's larger cities is clearly associated with the 
failure of hospitals-especially the smaller hospitals that are the major 
health institutions in small cities and nonmeiropolitan areas-to offer abor-
tions along with their other health services. Since public hospitals are 
even Iess likely than private hospitals to provide abortions, it is poor, 
rural and very young women who are most likely to be denied abortions 
as a result of the need to travel outside their own communities to obtain 
terminations. It is these women who are least likely to have the funds, 
the time or the familiarity with the medical system that they need to be 
able to cope with the problems associated with such travel." Id., at 121. 
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163-which I take to be another way of referring to a State's 
"preference for normal childbirth"-becomes compelling only 
at the end of the second trimester. Thus it is clear that St. 
Louis' policy preference is insufficient to justify its infringe-
ment on the right of women to choose to have abortions dur-
ing the first two trimesters of pregnancy without interference 
by the State on the ground of moral opposition to abortions. 
St. Louis' policy therefore "unduly burdens the right to seek 
an abortion," Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976). 















Application for Stay Presented 
to Justice Marshall and Referred 
to the Court 
DC (ED N.Y.) 
(Same) 
Some 80 members of Congress have fi~ed a letter, which they 
request to be considered as an amicus submission, in support of the 
stay application. They wish to bring the following to the Court's 
attention. 
The Labor/HEW Appropriations Act fails to appropriate 
funds for the purpose now covered by Judge Dooling's 
order. We respectfully reguest a stay of the order 
because it is contrary to [ Article I, Section 9, . 
Clause ~ Secretary Harris is bound to respect the 
mandate of Congress. Accordingly, we urge the Court 
to grant a stay pending appeal to avoid an invalid 
and unconstitutional judicial usurpation of legisla-
\1.\.J, rs Ill ~ po.~, ~wkv-~ 




lative power and the issuance of a judicial 
decree directly contravening an explicit 
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:~CKLE~ s &- ' 
.JP~ t. .. aL~ ~w~v. McRAE 
No. A-6~ /~~ ,.,. ';/ . _ (Same) ~~ 
HARRIS ~ ~'V I~ ~ A_; 
{ ~ 4M~ 1--1- k.-V z;-d) elrl> 
HcRAE ~ ~ ~~ ~~t/l..;;f:tj 
v. 
SU; '1ARY"7'" Pending appeal, the SG and'1rnt~~ 
seek to stay the mandate of the DC (ED N~~enjoined 
the s:ca~led Jii!de Amendment ' as being 1. The DC 
granted a "t_tay, ~>hich expires today, Febr~. Jus~jl 
today continued the stay pending further _ · o~~ -
Appellees, who oppose the stay, request 
jurisdiction, and consider their motion 
~e 
\ 
argument in ·· 
tandem with Williams, et al. v. Zbaraz, Nos. 79-4, 79-5 and 79-491. 
FACTS: The DC declared the Hyde Amendment to be unconstitu-
tional. The Court held that the statutory provisions limiting the 
availability of federal Medicaid funds for abortions during the current 




ponent of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because they 
bear no rational relationship to any legitimate governmental interest. 
The DC also ruled that the Hyde Anendment, deprives pregnant women 
of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment and the religious 
freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment, to the extent that the 
statutes discourage "individual decisions of religiously formed 
conscience to terminate pregnancy for medical reasons." 
Accordingly the DC ordered the Secretary to "[c]ease to give 
effect" to the Hyde Amendment insofar as it forbids ·federal Hedicaid 
payments for abortions that are "necessary in the professional 
judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician exercised in 
the light of all factors, physical, emotional, psychological, 
familial, and the woman's age, relevant to the health-related well-
being of the pregnant woman." The DC directed the Secretary to 
"[c]ontinue t~ authorize ~ expenditure of federal matchi~nds" 
for such abortions. Finally, the DC ordered the Secretary to inform 
HEW's regional directors of the DC's decision, and to require the 
di~ectors in turn to instruct participating states to notify all 
Medicaid providers of the existence of the injunction. 
Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases originally filed their 
complaints on September 30, 1976,. the day that Congress enacted the 
- original version of the Hyde Amendment. They alleged that the status 
violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment because it drew an invidious distinction between 
Medicaid recipients who carry their pregnancies to term and Medicaid 
recipients who choose to have an abortion, whether therapeutic or 
nontherapeutic. On October 22, 1976, the district court enjoined 




reimbursement for services related to pregnancy and childbirth. 
McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Several 
days later, the DC affirmed that it had "implicitly" held the Hyde 
Amendment unconstitutional. 
The Secretary appealed to this Court and suggested that the 
case be held for disposition in light of two other abortion funding 
cases then pending before the Court,~her v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 
(1977), and '· Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). After deciding Maher 
" 
and Beal, this Court. vacated the injunction in McRae and remanded 
the case for further consideration in light of those decisions. 
Califano v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1977). See also Califano v. McRae, 
434 U.S. DOl (1977). 
On remand, the DC again invalidated the statute and ordered 
L _ .. 
the Secretary to fund abortions not fundable under the Hyde Amendment. 
Here, the DC held impermissible the legislative distinction between 
medically necessary services generally, for which federal Medicaid 
' funds are available, and medically necessary abortions, for which 
federal funding is available only in limited circumstances. On its 
own motion, the DC stayed its order for 30 days, until February 14, 
l980. On February 4, 1980, the DC denied the applications of the SG 
and Intervenor-Appellants for a further stay pending disposition of 
the direct appeal to this Court. 
~G I s ~PLICATION FOR STAY: (1) - A stay should be granted 
because the DC decision is incorrect,since the currently effective 
version of the Hyde Amendment and its predecessors are rational 
legislative measures intended to: (a) further the governmental 
- 4 -
interest in preserving potential human life and encouraging child-
birth, and (b) avoid the expenditure of public funds for a puFpose 
many ~payers find mor~lly repugnant. (See government's brief 
in~ited States v. Zbaraz, No. 79-491, pp. 50-64.) (2) It is 
foolish to suggest, as the DC does, that the constitutionally 
guaranteed rights to speak and publish entail correspondi~g entitle-
ment to federal financial assistance to support those activities. 
The Hyde Amendment does not infringe upon the religious conscience 
to terminate pregnancy for medical reasons; it simply prohibits 
expenditures · of federal funds for such, unless continuation of 
pregnancy would endanger the life of the mother. (3) A stay should 
be granted to allow an Act of Congress to remain in effect,since 
federal statutes generally enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, 
consistent with the principle that Congress is entitled to implement 
its social and fiscal policies until they are definitively determined 
to be wrong. (4) Although the Court denied a stay in Zbaraz, this 
case differs because: (a) it is directed to the · federal government, 
and not an individual state, ' and thereby affects all states; (b) it 
invalidates pas4 as well as present, versions of the Hyde Amendment, 
which would afford the interpretation .that the Secretary is obligated 
to process claims for abortions performed as long ago as Oct. 1976. 
(c) it requires subsidization of medically-necessary abortions even 
during the period after fetal viability, which states could have 
outlawed earlier. 
APPELLEES' OPPOSITION TO THE SG'S STAY APPLICATION: (1) The 
standards which govern this application are the same as those applied 
by Justice Stevens in Zbaraz at 99 S.Ct. 2095, and by the full Court 
{ I 
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in Zbaraz at 99 S.Ct. 2833. (2) A DC order is ordinarily presumed 
to be valid, as should this one, which was decided consistent with 
precedents of this Court; this offsets the presumption of validity 
given to federal statutes, particularly in the absence of irreparable 
injury. (3) Even the SG concedes that denying a stav will not 
irreparably injure the federal government, but will rather cause - '- -· 
administrative inconvenience to the participating states. (SG Is 
Application No. 679, p. 7.) ( 4) However, implementing the injunction 
in the 26 states which do not now fund medically necessary abortions 
will simplify, rather than encumber, administration. of the Medicaid 
programs, since implementing the injunction requires only a simple 
notice and momentary change of practice; the 23 remaining states will 
welcome the change. (5) The DC order is not a warrant for illegal 
activity simply because it requires subsidization of medically 
necessary abortions even during the period after fetal viability, 
since it orders reimbursement only for those abortions which in fact 
were legal. ( 6) In balance, the irreparable injury to appellees 
is enormous, including mental' health and life-threatening unwanted 
pregnancies, death and complications from resort to illegal abortions, 
and, for those who may acquire the money, a delay which involves a 
significant increase in mortality and morbidity for the 25,000 
indigent pregnant women who live in non-funded states. (7) The 
Court should treat the stay applications as jurisdictional statements 
and expedite. 
INTERVENOR-APPELLM~TS' APPLICATION FOR STAY: Intervenor-Appellant~ 
filed a memo in support of the SG's position. They add that a stay 
is necessary to facilitate the orderly exercise of appellate jurisdic-
\ . ' 
... 
tion, in light of the of 5,000 pages, and the DC 
op~es, 92 footnotes and a 313 page review of 
legislative history. They do, however, oppose acceleration and 
consolidation with Zbaraz. 
APPELLEES'MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO THE INTERVENING-APPELLANTS' 
INTERIM STAY APPLICATION: (1) As the trial record has been available 
to counsel for 13 months, no delay is necessary, as they suggest, to 
permit them to file this with their jurisdictional statement, for 
which they have had an additio~al 30 days ffince the DC order. (2) An 
interim stay could militate against appellees' motion to schedule 
argument in tandem with Zbaraz. 
APPELLEES' MOTION TO SCHEDULE ARGUHENT IN TANDEM: Appellees 
submit that such is warranted because it: (1) obviates substantial 
questions concerning the propriety of exercising direct appellate 
jurisdiction in Zbaraz; and (2) avoids piecemeal litigation of the 
issues presented by federal and state restrictions on Medicaid 
reimbursement for abortions. 
' 2/14/80 Caldwell 
PJC 
t;ourr; ................... . V ULfjU Urt • •••.••••••••••••• , J ~. , , 
Argued ................... , 19 . . . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. A-66 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
JAMES L. BUCKLEY 
vs. 
CORA McRAE 





Burger, Ch. J .. ........ . 
Brennan, J ............ ...... ......... . 
Stewart, J ........... ... ....... ...... . 
White, J ........... ....... .......... . 
Marshall, J .......................... . 
Blackmun, J ......................... . 
Powell, J .............. . 
Rehnquist, J .... ....... . 
Stevens, J ........................... . 
JURISDICTIONAL 
STATEMENT 
N POST DIS AFF 
and by him referred to 
MERITS MOTION 
ABSEN'l' NOT VOTING 





. ....... ''/ :/. ................... . 
········i7 ···· ~··················· 
··· ····· ·····/ ···················· 
• • 






See .Hernorandurn No. A-663. 
2/14/80 Caldwell 
PJC 
Application for Stay Presented 
to Justice Marshall and Referred 
to the Court 
DC (ED N.Y.) 
r I I I 
t 






See Memorandum No. A-66,3. 
2/14/80 Caldwell 
PJC 
Application for S~ay ~res~ted 
to Justice I'1arshall and by him 
Referred to the Court 
February 15, 1980 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. A-679 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
PATRICIA R. HARRIS 
vs. 
CORA McRAE 
Application for stay presented to Justice Marshall and by him referred to 
the Court. 





Brennan, J ........................... . 
Stewart, J ........................... . 
White, J................ . ........... . 
Marshall, J .......................... . 
Blackmun, J ......................... . 
Powell, J .............. . 
Rehnquist, J ........... . 
Stevens, J ........................... . 
JURISDICTIONAL 
STATEMEN'J' 




ABSENT NOT VOTING 
G D 
. ~upuuu afttttrl ttf flrt ~tdt ~hrlt.tr 
Jl~Irittghm, ~. <!J. 20gtJ.t,~ 
C HAMBE RS OF" 




February 15, 1980 
Buckley v. McRae 
Harris v. McRae 
There are two points with respect to these cases on 
which it was necessary to give Mike Rodak instructions 
even though they were not expressly discussed by the 
Conference. I believe my instructions are consistent with 
the consensus but this letter is intended to make sure 
there is no objection. 
First, in order to set the case~ for oral argument, 
it is, of course, necessary first to note probable 
jurisdiction. The response on behalf of McRae requested 
the Court to treat the stay application by the Government 
as a jurisdictional statement. Obviously it is in the 
Government's interest to accept this suggestion by the 
respondent. Accordingly, the order will contain a 
reference to that request, and will specifically note 
probable jurisdiction. 
Second, I do not recall whether we agreed on a date 
to announce the decision to deny the application for a 
stay, but it seemed to me that there was no reason for 
action between now and Tuesday and that it would be more 
orderly simply to include that denial as a part of the 
disposition of the case in the regular order list on 
Tuesday. I therefore did not instruct the Clerk to advise 
the parties today of the Court's action. The order will, 
of course, note that .The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Powell 
and Mr. Justice Rehnquist would grant the stay. 
I don't think there should be any objection to the 
foregoing, but I thought it proper to make these points 
clear. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
Argued ................... , 19 . . . 
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
$>upr.cmt Qfourt of tip• ~lniub ~tatt.s 
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April 3, 1980 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I attach a memo from the Cl k. 
we will proceed to hear 79-12 8, Harris v. McRae, 
first. That seems to be th sensible solution. 
cc: Mr. Rodak 
• 
WILLIAM J. SCOTT 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF ILLINOIS 
130 NORTH F RANKLIN STR E ET, SUITE 300 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60606 
April 1, 1980 
l{ECl-:J "'\"1~1) 
APR 2 1980 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SUPREME COURT, U.S. 
TELEPHONE WELFARE 
79 3-2380 LITIGATION DIVIS ION 
The Honorable Michael J. Rodak, Jr. 
Clerk of the Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Building 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
RE: Williams v. Zbaraz, et al. 
Nos. 79-4, 79-5 and 79-491 
Dear Mr. Rodak: 
By letter of March 26, 1980, we have been advised to inform 
your office of the names of the members of the bar of the Supreme 
Court who will argue for the appellants in the above cases, the 
order of argument and the division of time. 
William A. Wenzel, III will present oral argument on behalf 
of appellant Miller, and attorneys for the other appellants are 
in apparent agreement that the attorney for Mr. Miller should make 
the opening argument as he is the principal defendant in these 
cases. 
No agreement, however, has yet been worked out with respect to 
the division of the 45 minutes alloted to the appellants and there 
are several reasons behind the present impasse. 
First, it should be noted that appellants in No. 79-4 (inter-
venors Williams and Diamond below) and appellees in No. 79-1268 
(intervenors Buckley et al.) are represented by the same attorneys 
and have indentical interests in these cases, namely, defending the 
constitutionality of the federal statute. Due to the manner in which 
the Court took jurisidiction over the McCrae case, intervenors 
Buckley, et al., are cast as appellees whereas in reality their in-
terests are aligned with appellant Harris. Since the Court has 
denied the motion of intervenors Buckley et al. to argue in McCr9e, 
intervenors Williams and Diamond cannot reasonably be expected t o 
agree to a division of the time to argue which gives them less than 
fifteen minutes. Appellant Miller agrees with thi s assertion. 
""·' 
As the principal defendant and with the responsibility for 
making "a fair opening of the case," Rule 44(5), Rules of the 
Supreme Court, appellant Miller believed that he would be allowed 
the remaining 30 minutes to argue. This belief was predicated, in 
part, upon the apparent waiver of any entitlement to argue in 
Zbaraz made by the Solicitor General in writing to the Court. See, 
Motion of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to Con-
solidate Oral Argument, filed March 21, 1980, denied March 31, 
1980. The willingness to waive argument in Zbaraz was "Because 
the Secretary's primary interest lies in defending the federal 
statute." Id. p.3 
It is now apparent that the Solicitor General desires to re-
tract his waiver and this office has been informed that the United 
States will seek a full 15 minutes of time in Zbaraz. If granted 
this time, it would reduce the time of the State .of Illinois to 
15 minutes . in Zbaraz and would increase the time of the United States 
to 45 minutes taking into account both McCrae and Zbaraz. We submit 
that this would be unfair to the appellant Miller and the State of 
Illinois. It also places Intervenors Williams and Diamond at risk 
should the additional time the state seeks be taken from them, 
a step which would be punitive in view of action of the Court to 
deny intervenors Buckley et al. an opportunity to argue in McCrae. 
On behalf of appellant Miller we submit that the Solicitor 
General should not be permitted to withdraw his waiver of entitle-
ment to argue in Zbaraz. Alternatively, any time permitted the 
United States for argument in Zbaraz should be less than the time 
allotted either the State or intervenors Williams and Diamond. 
This is reasonable since the position of the United States in Zbaraz 
is that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the constitutionality 
of the Hyde Amendment. Brief for the United States, p.23-29. As 
to the remaining non-Hyde Amendment issues, no case or controversy 
exists between the United States and the other parties arising from 
the final judgment of the District Court. Accordingly, it would be 
wasteful of the Court's time to permit the Solicitor General to 
merely argue that the Hyde Amendment should not be reviewed in the 
Zbaraz cases given the fact that it will be reviewed in McCrae. 
Moreover, the argument in the federal government's brief at pp.38-49 
can only be viewed as that of an amicus curiae since it is unrelated 
to the only issue involving the United States, namely, the Hyde 
Amendment'. s constitutionality. · 
/ 
• 
Michael J. Rodak, Jr. -3- April 1, 1980 
In summary, appellant Miller respectfully requests that any 
division of time for oral argument in the Zbaraz cases be measured 
against the "primary interests" of the three appellants as articulated 
in briefs and motions filed with the Court to date, with due regard 
being given to the fact that the responsibility for defending the 
constitutionality of the Illinois statute at issue in Zbaraz is entrusted 
under Illinois law solely to the Illinois Attorney General. See, e.g., 
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 409 U.S. 1072 (1972). 
WAW:bw 
cc Wade H. McCree, Jr. 
Patrick Trueman 
Peter Buscemi 
. , :K 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM A. WENZEL, III 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellapt Miller 
• 
O FFICE OF THE CLERK 
S UP RE M E COU RT O F THE UNITED STAT ES 
WASHINGTON . D . C .. 20543 
April 3, 1980 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
RE: Williams et al. v. Zbaraz et al.; 
Miller et al. v. Zbaraz et al.; and 
United States v. Zbaraz et al. 
Nos. 79-4, 79-5, and 79-491 
A problem has arisen among counsel in the Zbaraz 
cases as to the division of time for oral argument. I 
am attaching a copy of the letter received from the 
Special Assistant Attorney General of Illinois who will 
make the opening argument on behalf of appellant Miller. 
All parties have agreed that the problem on 
division of argument time could be resolved if Harris 
v. McRae, No. 79-1268, were to be argued first. The 
Government apparently intends to make the thrust of 
its argument in the McRae case and would have 30 minutes 
for the opening argument. 
Approval is requested to change the order of 
argument in the abortion cases to list Harris v. McRae 
as the lead case. If you agree to this change, I will 
promptly notify counsel by telephone. 
Attachment 
ResJf,ct:r,t)1 :ub~itted, 
~~1 ~~dlt Jr. 
Clerk 
~ 
t'ti tl" z:, 
Dear Roger: 
If conveniently available, I would like to have 
references to factual information on abortions. 
This Court's decision in Roe v. Wade was announced 
in February 1973, legalizing abortions during the first 
trimester. It would be interesting to see a table showing 
the number of abortions performed in the United States in 
each year from 1973 through 1979. 
I read in the press (within the last month as I 
recall) that last year (1979) the number of abortions in the 
United States exceeded for the first time the number of 
births. I would like the source of this information, if 
indeed there is an authoritative source. 
Finally, there seems to be wide differences of 
opinion as to whether legalized abortions have had a 
favorable impact on maternal morbidity and mortality among 
indigent pregnant women. 
There is a book entitled "Aborting America" 
published in 1979 by B. Nathanson. It is stated in Chapter 
24 of that book that: 
"The current rule of thumb is that fewer than 20 of 
100,000 pregnant women die." 
If there are any general statistics in this area, I 
would be interested in knowing whether Nathanson's statement 
is documented. 
Some of this information is set out in the District 
Court opinion in Harris v. McRae, No. 79-1268. In addition, 
the literature of the two contending lobbying groups (the 
"Right to Live" and the "Pro-Abortionists) may address these 
and like questions. Perhaps congressional hearings also have 
1 ' ~ 
,I 
developed statistical data. 
information. 
2. 
And possibly there may be census 
I do not want you to divert any of your staff from 
regular duties, as this is a low priority request. Indeed, 
if you could give me a bibliography with references to the 
relevant information, one of my clerks could conduct the 
research itself. 
Mr. Roger F. Jacobs 
lfp/ss 
. ~·. ~- .. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ellen 
DATE: April 19, 1980 
RE: No. 79-1268, Harris v. McRae 
Question Presented 
Do the Hyde Amendments, which authorize federal 
Medicaid funding for abortions only "where the life of the 
mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term," 
deprive indigent preqnant women of rights secured by the First 
Amendment or by the Equal Protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause? 
Background 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act establishes an 
assistance program (Medicaid) under which the federal government 
provides matching funds to States that reimburse the costs of 
medical treatment for needy persons. Although the Act does not 
specifically require participating States to pay for any 
particular procedure, it seems fairly clear that but for the -
r ,, 
2. 
Hyde Amendments, Title XIX would require States that wished to 
maintain their Medicaid eligibility to fund a certain minimum 
-----------~ ~-~-----------------------------------------benefit package that would include medically nP.cessary 
abortions. This statutory issue is raised in the Zbaraz cases, 
but I do not find it a difficult one. 
In September 1 97 6, Congress first enacted the Hyde 
Amendment as a section of the HEW appropriations act for fiscal 
year 1977. The amendment provided that "none of the funds 
contained in this Act shall be used to perform abortions excP.pt 
where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus 
were carried to term." 90 Stat. 1434. 
The 1978 appropriations bill included a similar 
provision, which added that funds could also be used for "the 
victims of rape or incest, when such rape or incest has been 
reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health 
service," and "in those instances where severe and longlasting 
physical health damage to the mother would result if the 
pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by two 
physicians." 91 Stat. 1460. This language was repeated in thP. 
fiscal year 1979 appropriations bill. After intense debate that 
delayP.d final decision for nearly two months, the fiscal year 
19 80 bill deleted the third except ion. It provides that funds 
will be available only in cases of life-endangerment and 
promptly reported rape or incest. 
Although the issue is not entirely free from doubt, I 
also think it clear that Congress did not intend that Title XIX 
3. 
would require States participating in Medicaid to fund medically 
necessary abortions that do not meet the Hyde standards. 
Despite some comments in the voluminous legislative history 
suggesting that the only question was whether the State or 
Federal Governments would pay for such abortions, the overall 
purpose of those who voted for the Hyde Amendments was 
overwhelmingly anti-abortion. It is inconceivable that these 
Congressmen would have intended to force the States to assume --
on pain of losing all right to federal reimbursement for 
Medicaid a burden of funding that Federal taxpayers had 
relinquished. This issue is also raised in Zbaraz, but 
apparently not in this case. 
These consolidated cases were filed on the same day 
Amendment. The DC' s that Congress enacted 




qrounds similar to those 
rejected in Maher v. Roe, 432 u.s. 464 (1977). After this Court 
vacated and remanded in light of Maher and its companion cases, 
the case took on a different shape. The present plaintiffs are 
indigent pregnant women who were in need of medically necessary 
abortions, doctors and health care providers who perform or 
provide facilities for abortions, two church-related women's 
groups whose membership is alleged to include poor pregnant 
women who believe that their freedom of conscience is inhibited 
by the Hyde Amendments, and several federal taxpayers. The DC 
certified nationwide classes of indigent women in need of 
medically necessary abortions and of abortion providers. 
f 
4. 
Trial was had between August 1977, and September 1978. 
In January 1980, the DC issued its 30 0 page opinion (plus a 300 s~ 
page appendix) holding the Hyde Amendment invalid on Equal 
Protection and First Amendment grounds. The DC's rambling 
opinion is not clearly grounded on any particular Equal ----
Protection theory. It appears that the DC thought (1) that the 
~ ... 
Hyde Amendment impinged upon a woman's fundamental right to 
decide to have an abortion under Roe v. Wade (313), (2) that it 
l ( 
operated to the disadvantage of a suspect class of adolescents 
(315), and (3) that it therefore must fall under the strict 
scrutiny branch of Equal Protection analysis. 
Alternatively, the DC held that the purpose of the 
Hyde Amendments was to prevent the exercise of a constitutional 
right and to prefer the life of the fetus over the health of a 
pregnant women. Neither was a permissible purpose. (313-314). 
Finally, the DC held that even if the purposes were permissible, 
the means were irrational. The DC simply found no reason to 
distinguish among medically necessary procedures or to prefer 
the life of the fetus over the health of the mother (319-320). 
The DC added that it was irrational to impose the burden of 
fighting abortion on the class "least able to sustain withdrawal 
of the procedure from the physician's battery of procedures," to 
exclude severe and long-lasting physical health damage as a 
ground for abortion, and likewise to excluoe grave fetal defect. 
(321-323). 
Turning to the First Amendment, the DC rei ected the 
5. 
plaintiffs' Establishment Clause attack on the ground that the 
legislation had plain secular purposes and that any 
"entanglement" was not of the type forbidden by the First 
Amendment. But the DC held that the Government violated the 
Free Exercise Clause by interfering in religiously formed 
beliefs that abortion is mandated to preserve the pregnant 
~~------~~---------------------------------------------women's health, or that it is a matter for responsible religious -individuals to make for themselves. 
Discussion 
I confess that I have not studied all of the Briefs, 
and my views are tentative at best. I do think, however, that 
there are several fairly easy issues in 
A 
I can't see even the shadow of a valid Establishment 
Clause objection here. Nothing could be plainer than that there 
are secular purposes for measures seeking to 1 imi t the use of 
taxpayers' funds for abortion. Nor do I believe that the 
unquestionable political divisiveness arising from the abortion 
controversy is the sort that should prevent Congress from acting 
in the area on Establishment Clause. To accept this position 
would prevent Congress from ever agreeing with a church that had 
taken a public position on a controversial issue. It would 
certainly also mean that Maher was incorrectly decided 
Congress also "establishes religion," in this view, by cutting 
off funds for non-therapeutic abortions. The First Amendment 
does not require this result. 
6. 
B 
The Free Exercise claim is equally insubstantial. 
Congress need not fund any exercise of religious belief. 
However, the Free Exercise claim may be relevant to the Equal 
Protection analysis. If an indigent pregnant woman could _________ ___.-.---~ 
actually show that her religious beliefs would be violated by 
carrying a fetus to term when an abortion was medically 
necessary, it is at least arguable that Congress "burdens" the 
exercise of that belief by cutting off otherwise auailable 
assistance only for abortions. See Sherbert v. Verner 374 u.s. 
398 (1963). It would follow that a court should scrutinize the 
discrimination under the strict scrutiny test. 
Nevertheless, I tend to agree with the SG that none of 
the plaintiff-appellees has properly raised the Free Exercise 
point. No plaintiff who holds the religious belief relied upon . 
has alleged that she desired an abortion, and no indigent 
pregnant plaintiff has alleged any such religious belief. We do 
have plaintiff associations who claim that some of their members 
meet both criteria. But the SG asserts that an association may 
not assert the constitutional rights of its members w~hey 
are so personal as to require individualized proof. See Hunt v. 
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 431 u.s. 333, 342-343 
(1977). 
This makes some sense to me, although my view may be 
colored by my incredulity that any religion would actually 
command a woman whose 1 ife was not endangered by her pregnancy 
7. 
to have an abortion. The DC seemed to think some religions hold 
this view, but most of the actual testimony cited appears to say 
only that the religion would find abortion ;ustified. I doubt 
that this would be enough to trigge~ First Arnennment protections 
if it were, a person could claim similar protection whenever 
he decides to do what he believes is riqht. In any event, J 
would want to see an actual plaintiff come forward to make this 
claim before I would rely upon it as a ground for invalidating 
an Act of Congress. 
c 
Turning to the Equal Protection claims, I agree with .... ~~~---
the SG that the various different versions of the Hyde Amendment 
should stand or fall together. There is no constitutionally 
s i g n i f i c ant difference. On the merits, I would have 
considerable difficulty upholding the DC's decision to strike 
down the Hyde Amendments on rational basis qrounds. In none of 
the voluminous briefs has it been adequately explained why the 
State interest in the potential life of the fetus is not 
legitimate. Roe v~ -wade recognized, as you wrote for the Court 
in Maher, that the State has a strong interest in protecting 
potential life throughout pregnancy, although it does not become 
compelling until the third trimester. 432 u.s., at 478. The 
Zbaraz appellees say that this interest is not present in this 
case, because the legislature (I would add that the same may be 
true of Congress) thought of the fetus as an actual rather than 
a potential life, and Roe held that the fetus is not a person. 




The various appellees also argue, quoting Maher, that 
the interest is only in promoting "normal chi l.dbirth." I also 
find this distinction insubstantial. Although the quality of 
the child's life in the circumstances posited in this case may 
not be what we would desire for our children or for society, I 
would not be prepared to say that the State may not value life 
for its own sake -- even in the case of a deformed child. We 
may disagree with the wisdom of the State's iudgment in forcing 
indigent women to bring such children into the world. But to 
say the interest is not legitimate would be to constitutionalize 
n. hotly disputed and deeply troubling area. If we are to say 
that a State's interest in "normal" potential lives is 
legitimate but its interest in "unhealthy" or "unsound" 
potential l.ives is not, what about actual lives? Does a State - ----
have a legitimate interest in barring euthanasia? In preventing 
infanticide of deformed children? I don't think a court can say 
that such interests are not permissible. 
Assuming the legitimacy of the State interest in 
potential 1 ife, the question is whether a State's choice to 
favor that interest over the health of the mother is a rational 
one. The SG argues that the Government may discourage resort to 
abortion except in the most urgent of circumstances, by creating 
incentives that make childbirth a more attractive alternative. 
Yet, the findings of both DC's are that the Hyde Amendment will 
morbidity and death, despite the 
life-endangerment exception. And there are other findings 
9. 
indicating that the existing families of such women may be 
seriously affected by her inability to terminate the pregnancy. 
The individual cases cited in the briefs are pathetically sad, 
---- --and the Government choice seems to me both cruel and tragically 
pain, and even death 2 
· digent pregnant women. 
I do not see how a court can apply the 
standard to second guess the Congress' i udgment 
-------------------~._-----------' ~ 
of these consequences are less substantial than the 
in preserving the potential 1 ife of even a non-viable 
The Zbaraz DC held that the State interest in the viable 
fetus outweighed the mother's interest in her own health, but 
that the interest in the non-viable fetus did not. But the very 
delicacy of this analysis, adapted from the Court's opinion in 
Roe v. Wade, reveals the defect in applying the rational basis 
standard here. Under that standard, it is not appropriate to 
weigh the competing interests in the way that the Court did in 
Roe, a strict scrutiny case. If the State has a substantial 
interest, it is not the Court's business to conclude that some 
other. interest outweighs it -- at least where the interests are 
not so strikingly and grotesquely out of proportion as to make 
the choice plainly irrational. 
I don't think that kind of striking disproportionality 
is present in this case. There is just no question that there 
are substantial interests on either side. Although I have not 
had time to analyze the figures provided by the Library in any 
' I 
1 0. 
depth, the maqni tude of the abort~p..qgUQrnenon sin_Q e Roe v. 
Wade i~ng. In ~: 8, ~ % of pregnancies 
nationwide ended in abortion. Looked at in a different way, 
there were 406 abortions for every 1000 live births. The 
fiqures for metropolitan areas are higher S and 579, 
respectively). In the District of Columbia in 1978 ,@of 
preqnant women had abortions. And there can be no doubt that 
the "medically necessary" standard, which includes psychological 
necesssity, leaves plenty of room for doctors to certify 
abortions in cases well removed from the extremes of cruelty 
that appellees rely upon. The figures from states that havE> 
switched from fundinq elective to only medically necessary 
abortions show that 20 50 % of all abortions meet the 
standard. Surely the Government may rationally concludP. that a 
tiqhter standard is appropriate. Nor do I think the "life-
ennanqerment" standard is as vaque and underinclusive as the 
appellees contend. 
In these circumstances, the fact that a court may 
disagree with the weights assigned to the competing interests by 
Congress is not a valid basis for holding the statute 
unconstitutional. Consequently, I would conclude that unless 
there is some basis for elevating the level of scrutiny, the 





The level of scrutiny is, for me, the most difficult 
~-------------~-
the case. Maher established that there is no 
11. 
constitutional right to have a Government-paid abortion, or 
indeed any abortion at all. Rather, the Government's obligation 
is not to interfere unduly with the zone of privacy that 
protects a woman's decision to have an abortion. Moreover, the 
State's election to encourage childbirth by funding it while 
denying funds to non-therapeutic abortions imposes no burden on 
the abortion decision. The State is not responsible for the 
indigency that makes it difficult for these plaintiffs to have 
abortions. Thus, the refusal to fund non-therapeutic abortions 
does not impinge on the interests protected by Roe v. Wane. 432 
u.s. 464. 
On its face, this reasoning appears to control this 
case as well, and I think the Court could legitimately 
that result. Yet, there may also be a way to distinguish 
and apply strict scrutiny. In Maher, the State of Connectic~ 
refused to grant a benefit to pregnant women that it also denied 
to other claimants -- funds to cover purely elective procedures 
that were not necessary to health. The only "necessary" 
treatment for those pregnancies were prenatal and childbirth 
services. Here, on the other hand, physicians have certified 
that the abortion is the preferred and "medically necessary" 
procedure. Although the Federal Government generally funds 
medically necessary procedures, it has singled out abortion in a 
way that makes it more difficult for recipients -- who would 
otherwise be entitled 
constitutional 
to payment to exercise their 




State does "create" the problem by extending a benefit generally 
to medically necessary procedures, then withdrawing it in a 
constitutionally protected context. 
The legal analogy is to Shapiro v~ -Thompson, 394 u.s. 
618 (1969), and Memorial ·Hospital v. Maricopa ··county, 415 u.s. 
250 (1974). Both cases recognize that denial of welfare 
benefits on the basis of residency requirements penalizes the 
right to travel across state lines. Similarly, denial of 
reimbursement for medically necessary expenses that otherwise 
would qualify for Federal assistance may penalize the right to 
seek an abortion. Indeed, in Maher you recognized this 
possibility: 
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to 
all women who had obtained abortions and who were 
otherw1se entitled to the benefits, we would have 
a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro and strict 
scrutiny might be appropriate under either the 
penalty analysis or the analysis we have applied 
in our previous abortion decisions. 432 U.S., at 
474-5 n. 8. 
Of course, 
I( ~' 
in Maher you were talking about qeneral assistance, 
not medical payments. Indeed, you continued: 
e c aim here is that the State "penalizes" 
woman's decision to have an abortion by 
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa 
County did not hold that States would penalize the 
right to travel interstate by refusing to pny the 
bus fares of the indigent travelers. Ibid. 
There, of course, you were referring to the Maher 
situation where the abortion claimants asked payments for 
elective procedures not available to anyone else. But this case 
is not the same. The analogy here might be to a State that 
generally paid bus fares for indigents but refused to pay it for 
1 3. 
those who crossed State lines. Although the case falls 
somewhere between the two examples given in Maher, I think it is 
at least arguably close enough to Maricopa ·county to trigger 
strict scrutiny. Indeed, the analogy is strengthened by some 
rather strong language in that case observing that medical care 
is a 11 basic necessity of life 11 and noting the absurdity of 
denying a sick person necessary treatment until his life is 
actually at risk. 415 U.S., at 259-261. 
I believe that this analysis may provide the only way 
to affirm the decision below. Although there is some talk in the 
briefs about the mother's interest in her own health, there is 
no precedent for elevating the level of scrutiny because of a 
11 fundamental interest 11 in health. Although health may be more 
basic to liberty than food, shelter, and education, I would have 
difficulty seeing a difference of constitutional proportions. 
If strict scrutiny is applied, the Government's choice 
must fall, at least as to the non-viable fetus. However, I have 
not thought the proposed analysis through in any depth and will 
try to supply further briefing some time next week. 
Conclusion 
A number of the issues here are not difficult. ( 1 ) I 
believe there is no Establishment Clause claim, and (2) no 
properly presented Free Exercise claim. In addition, (3) 
various claims strike me as so insubstantial as not to require 
much discuss ion. Among these are the intervenors' political 
question and appropriations power claims and the DC's mention of 
1 4. 
unconstitutional vagueness and discrimination against a "suspect 
class" of teenaged women. 
I think the Equal Protection claim is the real issue 
in the case. On that point, I do not believe the Court can 
invalidate this Act of Congress as irrational. (4) The purpose 
is plainly legitimate under settled law. (5) And the means, 
while undoubtedly unwise, represent a legislative balance that a 
court should not upset. 
There is a possibility, however, that ( 6 ) the 
Amendment might trigger strict scrutiny by analogy to the right 
to travel cases. I am troubled by the fact that neither court 
below proceeded on this basis. Nevertheless, if there is a way 
to invalidate the legislative choice in this case, I think that 
this is it. 
' ' 
79-1268 Harris v. McRae Argued 4/21/80 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: MR. Justice Powell 
RE: No. 79-1268, Harris v. McRae 
Mr. Justice Stewart's well-written opinion seems 
adequately to dispose of the case, and I recommend a join. I 
would note, however, that Justice Stewart's treatment makes the 
case appear somewhat easier than it actually is. The opinion 
does not meet the most serious arguments in the case head on; 
indeed, in places it is almost too glib. Thus, some additional 
footnotes or even rewriting may be necessary if those arguments 
are made in dissent. Moreover, there are places in which the 
Court's summary disposition of issues may have unwanted 
implications. If you agree that there are problems, I could 
raise some of these questions with Saul. 
The spots that I find a bit tenuous are as follows. 
(i) The discussion of Title XIX on pp. 13-16 cites practically 




statutory structure, related provisions, or the legislative 
history. Since the Court is reaching the result in a way that 
differs from that taken by all of the Courts of Appeals to have 
addressed the question, the discussion may be a little too thin. 
On the other hand, I doubt that any Justice has much interest in 
this and the dissent is not likely to attack it. 
( ii) Beneath the surface of the otherwise excellent 
standing discussion at pp. 30-33 is a puzzling question about 
the intersection of standing doctrines with class actions under 
Rule 23. The only mention made of this is in FN 22 on p. 51. 
The Court there seems to hold that a plaintiff who lacks 
standing to challenge action on a certain ground may never 
represent a class of people who do have standing. Although the 
principle seems unexceptional on its face, the full reach of the 
Court's statements could be unsettling to courts considering 
motions for class certification. 
In many Title VII cases, for example, named plaintiffs 
who have suffered from some form of employment discrimination 
are permitted to represent classes of persons who have suffered 
in very different ways. For example, present employees may 
represent classes of applicants for employment. Some courts 
have even permitted blacks to represent Hispanics and Asians. 
In deciding whether such classes are permisssible, courts 
generally do not apply strict standing doctrines. Instead, they 
ask whether the representative's claims are "typical" and 
3. 
whether he will represent the class adequately. I do not think 
the Court should imply that the named plaintiff has to have 
"standing" to make every claim that every member of the class 
may make. 
(iii) The Court disposes of the "fundamental 
interest" branch of the Equal Protection claim merely by 
referencing its Due Process analysis and saying that the Equal 
Protection Clause adds no "substantive rights or liberties." P. 
34. This, again, may be too quick. For example, there is no 
substantive right to have the State pay for a person's exercise 
of religious belief. But if the State establishes a general 
program of paying for certain items, it probably may not 
constitutionally discriminate against persons who desire those 
same items for religious purposes. Thus, if a State distributed 
I 
} 
free wine to anyone upon demand, I wonder if it could deny the 
wine to someone merely because he wishes to use it in a 
religious ceremony. See Sherbert v. Verner (State may not deny 
unemployment benefits to an employee discharged for exercising 
his religion). When the Court summarily equates the absence of 
a fundamental interest with the absence of an equal protection 
claim, it calls in question this line of analysis. 
(iv) Finally, the opinion finds a rational basis for 
this statute without really addressing the appellees' principal 
claim that it is irrational--that is, that it trades maternal 
health and possibly 1 i fe for fetal 1 i fe. Pp. 3 7-40. I think 
4. 
this section could be strengthened substantially; perhal;)s, as 
you have suggested, by pointing out the elasticity of the 
medical necessity standard and the magnitude of the abortion 
phenomenon. In this respect, however, I think it better to wait 
to see how the dissent will approach the problem. I do not 
think the rationality issue is a very substantial one, and the 
Court should not give the impression that it is unless the 




..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~up.rtlltt OJltUrl ~f tl{t~ttb ~bdt.l\' 
'!fag~~. OJ. 2ll.;t~' 
June 9, 1980 
Re: 79-1268 - Harris v. McRae; 79-4, 79-5 
and 79-491 - Williams v. Zbaraz 
Dear Potter: · 
As soon as feasible--whatever that may mean--
! shall circulate a dissent. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
.§uprtmt <!Jourt of tltt ~lnittb :§tatu 
Waslrington. ~. <!J. 20,?>1-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 9, 1980 
Re: No. 79~1268 - Harris v. McRae 
Dear )?otter: 
I await the dissent. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 






CHAMBER S OF 
~nvum~ <!fou:rt of i1l.c 'Jlhrit.cll ~tat.c;.r 
~Irhtgtott, il}. <!f. ZO?>t.~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE June 10, 1980 
Re: No. 79-1268 - Harris v. McRae ---
Dear Potter, 
With reservations about footnote 24, 
I join the remainder of your opinion. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 





.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
;§u:p:rtutt <!Jatttt ttf tlft ~tb ~taf.tg 
jirasfrin:ghm. ~. <!J. 2llgtJ!.~ 
June 10, 1980 
Re: No. 79-1268 Harris v. McRae 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me in your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely, · 
~ 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
,C 
Potter: 
I mentioned the possibility of making a suggestion 
or two with respect to your fine opinion that I have joined. :' 
~; \.::;,:'""!} :tf' - ::\'.i ""~ 
The most appealing point in the District Court ~s 
opinion (particularly in Zbaraz) is that Congress acted 
irrationally in subordinating maternal health and possibly 
life for fetal life. Si"ce our opinion applies (as did 
-. Maher) a rational basis standard, meeting this argument is 
~ rather central to the analysis. Indeed, this focuses on the 
only difference between Maher and the ,two cases presently 
before us. . !!:~~,~ , _ ,,j!,., :.;.;~" ·-·'' 
~ ·:: 
As you argue, the basic answer to the "maternal 
health and life versus fetal life" arqument is the one you 
have made: the question of rationality normally is left to 
the legislative brltnch. Only in the exceptional case can a 
court properly Fubstitute its judqment for that of the 
legislature as to rationality. This is especially true,· 
again as you make clear, where ·•'sensitive policy choices are 
involved. ' < ~J 
~rJQJ;o.;'#.a.~f ·- -'~(11: ~~ • o\ ... ,~·"'IIF' ~.·'-">'l<.t r. '\~.'li~·"' 
~-w~~ll' tt. 
I do think, however, that our position can be 
strenqthened substantially by emphasizin~ the elasticity of 
the "medically necessary" standard. Appellants argue that, 
in effect, this more often than not permits abortions at the 
'" elect ion of the mother. The testimony of sorne of the 
physicians, particularly in Zbaraz, makes clear that doctors 
tend to be persuaded easily that there is some "medical 
' ·,'~ necessity". . ~~ 
,. . ~ -· .. .. .. ~-
•· .• ~i' a•~ 
"· The testimony of Dr. Depp in Zbaraz (to take one -::" . '/ 
example) was that from 20% to 50% of all pregnancies come ,,, 
within this category. (App. 107J Appellant's brief 42). Dr. 
Depp also testified that the mortality rate for preqnant 
women was two per 10,000 (App. 106). One could quess that 
two out of every 10,000 pre~nant women die from a.utomobile 
accidents, slippinq in bathtubs, or in quarrels with their 
husbands or lovers. 
" 
~ 
I am sendinq you with this letter the .. 
November/December 1979 issue of Family Planninq Perspectives. 
I think you will find some interestinq statistics in the 
article that commences on paae 329. They show, for example, 
1 that 28.9% of all pregnancies ended in abortions in the year 
1978. (Or putting these figures differently, for every live 
1,000 births in 1978 there were 406 abortions). The rate 
climbs to 35% in major metropolitan areas. Althouqh I am 
sure where I saw the fiaure, the , rate in the District of 
Columbia~was reported to be 59%. ~~ 
tb ~·1J r::' 
I do not think that statistics such as the 
foreqoina add sianificantly to strictly leqal analysis. They 
- or at least some of them (such as Dr. Deop's testimony) -
nevertheless could be vi~wed es supportina the . rationality of 
the dec is ion made by Conaress, even thouqh one ipay have . 
wished it had qone the other way. 
In terms of leqal ~nalysis the fundamental flaw 
the District Court's opinion is that it undertook to "w~iah" 
the state and private interests, and concluded that the ., 
1 
private interest of preanant mothers in obtaining medically • 
necessary abortions •outweighs" t.he state interests that you 
have identified in your opinion. The District Court erred in 
substitutinq its judament for that of the legislative branch. 
There may be another point or two that ~ I will ask 
my clerk, Ellen Richey, to speak to your clerk - . I believe ,, ·,t··· 
Saul Goodman has worked with you on this case. I suppose, ·· h 
however, that it may be well in any event to "hold your fire• ~ ,~ , 
until you see what the dissenting <?Pi.nions have to s~y. One ·{:-~, .. ··'' 




~i ,. '* ,,. 1;. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE w .. . J. BRENNAN, JR. 
~npum.t <!Jaurl of tlft ~b ~taft.&' 
:.aglyittgLttt. ~. <!J. 20~'!~ 
June 20, 1980 
RE: No. 79-1268 Harris v. McRae 
79-4, 79-5, 79-491 Williams v. Zbaraz 
Dear John: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion in the above 
cases. As you know, we were on opposite sides in Maher. ]n 
order to avoid any inconsistency between your opinion andmy 
views in that case, I wonder if you could make the following 
two changes in your discussion of Maher: 
On page 2, line 4: delete the word "fundamentally". 
On page 2, line 17: insert at the end of the line, 
"Court held that the". 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
li 
1-'· 
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